Jensen and Meckling (1976) explore management agency costs, which emanate from the principal-agent relationship that separates the ownership from the management (control) of the firm. An owner (principal) of a closely held firm can either hire someone to manage her firm (agent) or can run the firm herself. The owner’s goal in this decision is to maximize her own welfare, not the value of the firm. Owner welfare maximization and firm value maximization can be inconsistent in this decision, leading to external agency costs, which are different from the internal agency costs explored by Jensen and Meckling. We use this distinction to examine the definition and empirical measurement of management agency costs for closely held firms.
活动时间：星期五, 2011-04-15 08:50 - 12:00 
活动地点： 湖南长沙皇冠假日酒店 
活动演讲人： 
