摘要：
Even though a large number of investment banks compete for initial public offerings (IPOs), we posit that the real competition takes place in a series of local oligopolies based on industry specialization. We develop a non-price competition theory of IPO underpricing based on localized competition and differentiated IPO underwriting services. We test our model implications on all-star analyst coverage, industry expertise, and other non-price dimensions.
Together, the non-price dimensions account for approximately 30% of the observed underpricing. Furthermore, we posit that venture capitalists (VCs) are especially focused on allstar analyst coverage, and develop the analyst lust theory of the underpricing of VC-backed IPOs. Consistent with this theory, we find that VC’s desire for all-star analyst coverage explains more than 50% of the effect of VC-backing on IPO underpricing.
活动时间：星期四, 2011-03-24 15:30 - 18:00 
活动地点： 交大徐汇校区浩然大厦102报告厅 
活动演讲人： Stephen Sparkes,摩根士丹利Enterprise Infrastructure 全球COO 
